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WILL STATES CONTINUE TO PROVIDE EXCLUSIVITY IN
TRIBAL GAMING COMPACTS OR WILL TRIBES BUST ON
THE HAND OF THE STATE IN ORDER TO EXPAND INDIAN
GAMING
Katie Eidson*
I. Introduction
The Indian gaming industry has hit the ground running since Congress enacted
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) in 1988.' Today, tribal gaming
operations in Oklahoma have grown to comprise the "largest number of Indian
gaming operations in the country."2 For this reason, the National Indian Gaming
Commission (NIGC) has centered its "enforcement activity in recent years" in
the Heartland.' The focus of this activity is geared toward "determining what
sort of gaming was permissible without tribal-state gaming compacts, and Class
III gaming which is only permitted under compacted arrangements." 4 To address
this issue, the Oklahoma Legislature passed Senate Bill 553, authored by Senator
President Pro-Tempore Cal Hobson, titled, the State-Tribal Gaming Act (Act)
which Governor Brad Henry signed in March 2004.' The Act received much
opposition, and through the impetus of a referendum, combatants rallied for a
statewide vote.6 The Legislature amended portions of Senate Bill 553 and
* Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author would like
to thank Professor Robertson for his encouragement and insight.
The author would like to dedicate this article to Joy and Wayne Eidson for their
unconditional love, guidance, and support, and to her best friend for life, Jay Griffen.
1. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000); see Oversight Hearing on the Indian Regulatory Act
Before the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 64 (2001) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearing] (statement of Montie R. Deer, Chairman, National Indian Gaming Commission)
(footnote omitted).
2. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, Chairman Hogan Addresses Oklahoma Legislators, at
http://www.nigc.gov/nigc/documents/releases/okla-legislators.jsp (Jan. 29, 2004).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. OKLA. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES RESEARCH Div., SESSION HIGHLIGHTS 2004, at 7
(Nancy Marshment ed., 2004), available at http://www.lsb.state.ok.us/house/2004%20Session
%20Highlights.pdf [hereinafter SESSION HIGHLGHTS] (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).
6. Id.
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proposed a newly drafted version as Senate Bill 1252.' Senate Bill 1252 was
presented to voters on November 2, 2004, as State Question 712.8
State Question 712 passed with 59.47% approval. 9 Many of the "large[r]
tribes such as the Chickasaw, Choctaw and Cherokee nations spent" large sums
of money in an effort to pass State Question 712.10 These tribes support the
legislation and its potential to "stabilize the state's growing gaming industry."' 1
By passing State Question 712 Oklahoma expects to receive $71 million for state
education. The tribes endure this loss of revenue as an opportunity to provide
electronic gaming.12
The purpose of the Act is to provide for the cooperative formation of a state
compact with federally recognized Indian tribes on tribal lands." The compact
provides that Indian tribes must enter into compacts with the State before
receiving the authority to operate Class III gaming on their lands, while
simultaneously providing for a means of state regulation. 4 Governor Brad Henry
stated that the act "does not expand gaming but allows... [Oklahoma] for the
first time in history to share in... [gaming] revenues.""
Profit sharing of tribal gaming takes place through exclusivity provisions that
allow the State to reap the benefits of the lucrative gaming industry. 6 The
revenue sharing provisions within the Act are not means to "limit the tribe's right
to operate any game that is Class H1 under IGRA and no Class 11 game shall be
subject to the exclusivity payments set forth... [in] this Compact."' 7 In fact, the
provisions provide that an Indian tribe "covenants and agrees to pay to the state
a fee derived from ... [Class EI gaming]" provided for in the statute. 8 The
revenue accrued will benefit the Oklahoma Higher Learning Access Fund and the
7. Id.
8. Marie Price, Groups Stake Out Positions on Issues, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 26,2004, at
Al.
9. General Election Results (Nov. 2, 2004), at http://www.state.ok.us/-elections/04gen.
html.
10. Tribal State Gaming Compact Approved in Oklahoma, INDIANZ.CoM, Nov. 3, 2004,
at http://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2004/005143.asp?print-l.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. State-Tribal Gaming Act, 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281 (West 2005).
14. Racetrack Gaming Proposition, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, June 13, 2004, at 12A.
15. Rob Martindale, Governor Stumps for State Questions, TULSA WORLD, Aug. 18, 2004,
at A9.
16. Marie Price, Tribal Gaming Facing a New Deal, TULSA WORLD, May 25, 2003, at Al;
see State-Tribal Gaming Act, 3A OKLA. STAT., § 281.
17. State-Tribal Gaming Act, 3A OKLA. STAT. § 281.
18. Id.
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Education Reform Revolving Fund.19 These provisions are ones of substantial
exclusivity.2" In essence, the result of substantial exclusivity provides Indian
tribes the substantially exclusive right to operate Class In gaming, provided that
they contribute a certain portion of their revenues to the state.2'
This note analyzes the Oklahoma State-Tribal Gaming Act with the
development of other state compacts. Practitioners and those focusing on gaming
regulatory measures will gain insight on the future direction of the substantial
exclusivity provision and its effect. This note addresses the progression from
substantial exclusivity to limited exclusivity provisions in light of the divergence
from total exclusivity provisions in state tribal-gaming compacts.
This note will provide a historical analysis into the background of the IGRA.
Within the analysis of the IGRA in part II, there will be a discussion of the
distinction between the different classes of gaming, focusing on Class Ill gaming.
Part Ill analyzes the states equivalent of a tax created by way of revenue sharing.
This section also addresses the migration toward the provisions of substantial
exclusivity as bargaining power in Class III gaming compacts along with
concerns raised in regard to these revenue sharing provisions. Part IV discusses
the meaning of exclusivity, followed by an examination of states' revenue
sharing provisions created within states' tribal gaming compacts. While
analyzing a majority of the states' revenue sharing agreements, this note will also
incorporate concerns expressed with regard to those particular states. Part V will
discuss George Skibine's statements on revenue agreements. This note concludes
with a discussion and evaluation of the future of exclusivity provisions within
state tribal gaming compacts.
II. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act - IGRA
A. Landmark Decision of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians
The Supreme Court of the United States set forth the foundation for the
gaming industry in the key decision of California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians.22 In Cabazon, the Court held that Indian tribes have the right to conduct
gaming activities on reservation land without regulation by state or local
authorities.23 In Cabazon, California sought to disallow certain types of Indian
gaming and to place laws on Indian tribes located on the Cabazon Band
19. SESSION HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 5.
20. State-Tribal Gaming Act, 3A OKLA. STAT., § 281, (West 2005).
21. Id.
22. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
23. Id. at 221-22.
No. 2] NOTES
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reservation.24 However, California is a Public Law 280 state, which means
enforcement of its criminal laws extends to Indians in Indian Country.25 Public
Law 280 does not impose the state's regulatory and civil laws upon Indians in
Indian Country.26
The overriding factor in Cabazon was whether California's law regulated or
prohibited certain types of gaming operations in the state.27 The Court reached
its decision on the basis that "California permits a substantial amount of
gambling activity, including bingo, and actually promotes gambling through its
state lottery ... that California regulates rather than prohibits gambling."
California's endeavor to regulate gaming on the Cabazon Band reservation was
civil/regulatory in nature, and thus not permitted.2"
B. Enactment and Purpose
The Cabazon decision played a major role in shaping the future of Indian
Gaming by finding that states where gaming is not criminally prohibited possess
no authority to regulate such gaming.29 Therefore, Congress provided the only
means of relief for states in dealing with gaming regulation where it was not
criminally prohibited. Due to the influx of state regulation requests to the
legislature, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988."0 This
posed a "legislative limitation to the tribal power recognized in... Cabazon."'
Under IGRA, Congress established the National Indian Gaming
Commission.32 The purpose of the Commission is set forth in three primary
objectives.33 It is the Commission's intention to regulate Indian gaming, to guard
it against corruption, to ensure that the benefit from Indian gaming focuses first
24. Id. at 202.
25. Id. at 209; see Pub. L. No. 280, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (2000).
26. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209 ("[I]f the state law generally permits conduct at issue, subject
to regulation, it must be classified as "civil/regulatory" and Public Law 280 does not authorize
its enforcement on an Indian reservation.").
27. Id. at 202.
28. Id. at211.
29. Kevin K. Washburn, Recurring Problems in Indian Gaming, 1 WYO. L. REV. 427,428
(2001); see Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202.
30. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (2000).
31. Washburn, supra note 29, at 428.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 2704.
33. Id. § 2702; Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, Statement of Priorities, at
http://ciir.cs.umass.edu/ua/October2OO/regplan/NATIONALINDIANGAMING_
COMMISSION_(NIGC).html [hereinafter NIGC Priorities] (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
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and foremost on Indian tribes, and to promote fair play amongst the Indian tribes
and their customers.34
In addition, three primary objectives are given by Congress in its enactment
of IGRA.35 The first objective is "to provide a statutory basis for the operation
of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic
development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments."36 The second
objective of the NIGC is "to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary
beneficiary of the gaming operation, and to assure that gaming is conducted
fairly and honestly by both the operator and players."37 The third and final
objective of the NIGC is "to declare that the establishment [on Indian lands] of
independent Federal regulatory authority for gaming .... Federal standards for
gaming... [and] a National Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet
congressional concerns... and to protect such gaming as a means of generating
tribal revenue."3
C. Classification of Gaming Classes
IGRA grants statutory authority for tribes to operate gaming operations not
prohibited by federal law and creates three categorical classifications for these
gaming activities.39 These three categories are Class I, Class II, and Class II
gamingi ° Class I gaming includes traditional games associated with tribal rituals
conducted for minimal prizes.4 The authority to regulate Class I gaming rests
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes.42
Class II gaming includes games that traditionally include an element of
chance.43 These games commonly include bingo and can also include lotto,
punch boards, tip jars, and pull tabs because the playing of these games takes
place in the same location as bingo." Class II gaming also includes card games
that are "explicitly authorized by the laws of the state" as well as card games the
state does not prohibit and that occur in the state.45 IGRA expressly excludes
34. NIGC Priorities, supra note 33.
35. 25 U.S.C. § 2702.
36. Id. § 2702(1).
37. Id. § 2702(2).
38. Id. § 2702(3).
39. Id. §§ 2701(5), 2703.
40. Id. § 2703.
41. Id. § 2703(6).
42. Id. § 2710(a)(1).
43. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i).
44. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(i)(III).
45. Id. § 2703(7)(A)(ii).
NOTESNo. 2]
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from Class II gaming, banking card games such as blackjack or slot machines of
any kind.46
Indian tribes retain their autonomy to conduct, license, and regulate Class II
gaming on Indian lands provided that the state in which the Indian tribe is located
allows such gaming.4 7 In conjunction with the states allowance of gaming, the
tribe's governing body must adopt a gaming ordinance approved by the
chairman.48 In effect, the tribal governments are accountable for regulating Class
II gaming with Commission oversight.49
The final and broadest category is Class Ill gaming. Class III gaming includes
"all forms of gaming that are not Class I gaming or Class II gaming."5° Class Ell
games commonly include games played at casinos, such as craps, poker,
blackjack, and roulette. Class III games also include those types that fall under
wagering games and electronic facsimiles. Realizing that states face major
policy concerns with regard to Class III gaming, Congress created certain criteria
for tribes that wish to offer Class I gaming on Indian lands.51
The first criterion is that the tribes must meet the same requirements set forth
under Class II gaming.52 Once the tribes meet the Class H requirements, they are
allowed to offer Class I gaming only if the state in which the Indian land is
located allows Class III gaming to occur.53 The next criterion requires that the
tribes must first negotiate a tribal-state compact with the state and then receive
approval from the Secretary of the Interior in order to engage in Class I
gaming.5
4
Under IGRA, Congress requires states to act in good faith when entering into
negotiations with Indian tribes." If the state fails to abide by these good faith
guidelines, Indian tribes can seek relief through the United States federal court
system.6 This sought to provide the tribes with a great deal of bargaining power
when dealing with the states. However, the United States Supreme Court in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida disregarded the right to bring suit in federal court."
46. Id. § 2703(7)(B).
47. Id. § 2710(b)(1).
48. Id. § 2710(b)(1)(B).
49. Id. § 2710(b)(2)(A)
50. Id. § 2703(8).
51. Id. § 2710(d).
52. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(A)(ii).
53. Id. § 2710(d)(1)(B).
54. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
55. Id.
56. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i).
57. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
[Vol. 29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/4
In Seminole, the Supreme Court ruled that under Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, the Indian tribes no longer have the right to bring suit against a
state in federal court for failure to comply with the good faith negotiation
provision set forth by IGRA. s This decision did not change the purpose and
extent of IGRA, yet it provided a means of legal escape for states that do not
wish to engage in good faith negotiations with the tribes.59 The ability of the
states to profit through revenue sharing has created a huge incentive for tribes
and a leveraging tool for states when entering into state compacts with Indian
tribes.
III. States Profit Through Means of Revenue Sharing
A. Revenue Sharing in Light of Seminole Tribe v. Florida
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole, the notion of whether
to permit states to engage in profit sharing through Indian gaming revenues
pursuant to the state compacting process, has created concern within the Indian
community. Indian tribes now face sharing their gaming profits in order to
secure the necessary state compact to engage in Class III gaming on Indian
lands.6" These revenue sharing "agreements" contain revenue sharing and
regulatory fee provisions that are arguably violations of federal law.61 The
revenue sharing provisions are the most controversial part of state tribal-gaming
compacts because federal law prohibits a state from taxing a tribal government,
and IGRA specifically prohibits a state from taxing or charging a fee to an Indian
tribe for engaging in Class Il gaming.62
B. What is Required for the Legality of Revenue Sharing Provisions?
State governments have continuously "looked to Indian gaming as a means to
address huge budget deficits., 63 States that wish to engage in revenue sharing
from Indian gaming must formulate their revenue sharing provisions in a manner
58. Id. at 72-73.
59. Id.; see United States v. Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission Indians, 33 F. Supp. 2d
862, 866 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (allowing states to forgo negotiations for Class III gaming compacts
with Indian tribes).
60. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76.
61. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(4) (2000) (charging fees or assessment upon Indian gaming is
prohibited).
62. Id.
63. Kelly B. Kramer, Current Issues in Indian Gaming: Casino Lands and Gaming
Compacts, 7 GAMING L. REv. 329,333 (2003), (citing Erica Wemer, Deficit-Ridden States Eye
Indian Gaming Cash, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Apr. 27, 2003, at 20A.).
NOTESNo. 2]
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to bypass the prohibition against tax impositions. The question faced by states is
how to secure a legally enforceable revenue sharing agreement between the local
government and the Indian tribes.
The IGRA specifies five statutory uses of tribal gaming revenue.' The
legislation is embodied in 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v). The section reads
as follows:
Net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes
other than[:] (i) to fund tribal government operations or programs; (ii)
to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribes and its
members; (iii) to promote tribal economic development; (iv) to
donate to charitable organizations; or (v) to help fund organizations
of local government agencies.65
The Department of the Interior approves such revenue sharing compacts on the
basis that the compacts provide for substantial exclusivity for Indian gaming in
the state. 6 The Department of the Interior's position, stated by Aurene Martin,
Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, is as follows:
To date, the Department has only approved revenue sharing payments
that call for tribal payments when the state has agreed to provide
valuable economic benefit of what the Department has termed
substantial exclusivity for Indian gaming in exchange for the
payment. As a consequence, if the Department affirmatively
approves a proposed compact, it has an obligation to ensure that the
benefit received by the state under the proposed compact is
appropriate in light of benefit conferred on the tribe. Accordingly, if
a payment exceeds the benefit received by the tribe, it would violate
IGRA because it would amount to an unlawful tax, fee, charge, or
assessment. While there has been substantial disagreement over what
constitutes a tax, fee, charge or assessment within this context, we
believe that if the payments are made in exchange for the grant of a
valuable economic benefit that the governor has discretion to provide,
these payments do not fall within the category of prohibited taxes,
fees, charges, or other assessments. 67
64. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(B)(i)-(v) (2000).
65. Id.
66. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Martin
Statement] (statement of Aurene M. Martin, Acting Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs).
67. Id.
[Vol. 29
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Therefore, revenue sharing provisions that provide for substantial exclusivity are
enforceable in state compacts.68
C. Concerns Raised Regarding Revenue Sharing Provisions
States in need of extra monies are vigorously attempting to share in the
benefits of Indian gaming.69 Indian gaming creates a number of employment
and "economic activity in 29 [sic] states," but only a small number of those
states have created agreements with tribes to "share casino revenues."7 Some
believe that states are taking advantage of gaming tribes' revenues and ignoring
the true impact felt by tribes.7 Despite the fact that tribes are provided with
"substantial exclusivity" over gaming, "Jacob Viarrial, governor of the
Pojoaque, told lawmakers" that "revenue sharing has become a smokescreen for
",72 Joextortion. Pedro Johnson, the executive director of public affairs for the
Mashantucket Pequot, stated that "[s]tates should not balance their budgets on
the backs of Indian governments. It's patently unfair."73 Some tribes are so
adamantly opposed to sharing in revenues and sharing in gaming operations, that
there have been reports of tribes paying named leaders to keep state revenue
compacts off state ballots.74
Though revenue sharing has yet to receive recognition recognized as legal
under the IGRA,7 5 tribes agree that they can gain from these agreements formed
with their respective states.76 However, tribes seem to view this revenue
sharing trend with much apprehension.7"
68. Id.
69. Pamela M. Prah, States Vie for Bigger Payouts from Tribal Casinos, KANSAS CITY
INFOZINE, Dec. 12, 2004, available at http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/
sid/4767/
70. Id.
71. It's Always Easier to Spend Someone Else's Money, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 7,
2004, at I OA.
72. Tribes with Casino Profits Adverse to Aiding Strapped States, GAMING MAGAZINE, July
10, 2003, available at http://gamingmagazine.com/managearticle.asp?c=280&a=7900.
73. Id.
74. Indian Casino Revenue Is Still Off-Limits to State, CASINO MAGAZINE, Oct. 8, 2004,
available at http://casinomagazine.com/managearticle.asp?c=280&a= 12118.
75. 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(4) (2000) (charging fees or assessment upon Indian gaming is
prohibited).
76. States Look at Indian Gaming Revenue, GAMBLING NEWS, Apr. 25, 2003, available at
http://www.casinoman.net/Content/casinogamblingnews/article/states-look-at-indianga
mblingrevenue.asp.
77. Id.
No. 21
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IV The Construction of Revenue Sharing States'Exclusivity Provisions in
State Tribal Gaming Compact
A. Definition of Exclusivity
The term "substantial exclusivity" provides local tribes with the exclusive
authorization to operate Class III gaming within the state's territory.78 In essence,
tribes receive "substantial exclusivity, by [states] prohibiting non-Indian gaming
from competing with Indian gaming or by agreeing to relinquish payments if non-
Indian gaming is permitted by the state in the future."79 The meaning of
exclusive is when:
[T]he Tribes enjoy the exclusive 'right to operate' so long as the
Tribes are the only persons or entities who have and can exercise the
'right to operate' electronic games of chance in the State or, in other
words, as long as all others are prohibited or shut out from the 'right
to operate' such games.80
B. Comparison of States 'Revenue Sharing Provisions
Arizona, California, Colorado, Michigan, New Mexico, New York,
Wisconsin,"' Connecticut, 2 and now Oklahoma83 have each entered into revenue
sharing agreements regarding tribal gaming. This note provides an analysis of
a majority of the states' revenue-sharing provisions.
1. Oklahoma
On November 2, 2004, Oklahoma created a State-Tribal Gaming Act for
purposes of Indian gaming.' The Oklahoma compact provides substantial
exclusivity for Indian tribes for electronic games and total exclusivity for card
78. E.g., Press Release, Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior, Department of the Interior
(on file with the Office of Indian Gaming Management, Bureau of the Indian Affairs)
[hereinafter Babbitt Press Release], available at http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/
indnmcom.html.(Aug. 23, 1997).
79. Id.
80. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d, 850, 852 (W.D.
Mich. 2000).
81. Id.
82. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, National Conference of State Legislatures
2004, at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/statetribe/trgaming.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2005).
83. State-Tribal Gaming Act, 3A OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 281 (Part 11) (West 2005).
84. Id. § 261.
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games.85 However, the compacts require tribes to pay a portion of their revenues
to the state in return for this exclusivity. 6
Oklahoma first requires tribes to pay 4% "of the first ten million dollars...
of adjusted revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of...
games."8'  Second, tribes must pay 5% "of the next ten million dollars of
adjusted gross revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of...
games. 8 Third, the tribe must pay 6% to the state of "all subsequent adjusted
gross revenues received by a tribe in a calendar year from the play of...
games."89 Last, the state requires the tribe to pay 10% of its "monthly net win of
the common pool(s) or pot(s) from which prizes are paid for nonhouse-banked
card games."9 Ttribes must pay an annual oversight assessment to assist the
state with costs incurred that are related to the state's oversight of the gaming
operations.9 The tribes must also deposit a one-time start-up fee of $50,000 to
assist the state with administrative duties.92
The state shall distribute the different revenue percentages collected under
various statutory provisions by allocating 10% of the revenues to the Oklahoma
Tax Commission, by allocating 12% to the Oklahoma Higher Learning Access
Trust Fund, and by allocating 88% to the Education Reform Revolving Fund.93
The revenue totals will be distributed annually to the Department of Mental
Health and Substance Abuse Services to treat those with compulsive gambling
disorders.94
2. California
California is one of the highest-grossing states for tribal gaming,95 therefore
California's compact program will be discussed in more detail than the other
states. California established the right to operate gaming on Indian lands in
March of 2000 when voters passed legislation that amended the state's
constitution.96 The legislation requires tribes to enter into a compact with the
85. Id. § 281 (Part 1).
86. Id at Part 4(A).
87. Id at Part 11 (A)(2)(a).
88. Id at Part 11 (A)(2)(b).
89. Id at Part 11 (A)(2)(c).
90. Id at Part 11 (A)(2)(d).
91. IdatPart I1 (B).
92. Id at Part 1I (C).
93. Id. § 263.
94. SESSION HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 5.
95. See Prah, supra note 69.
96. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19.
No. 2]
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state in order to operate Class I1 gaming on Indian lands.97 These compacts
include revenue sharing provisions that require for annual payments of gaming
revenues to the state; however, the state grants the tribes the exclusive right to
slot machine gaming.9'
The revenues received in California from gaming operations flow into the
Gaming Revenue Trust Fund.99 This fund receives all revenue payments
required under the California Constitution. "° The first payments require Indian
tribes to pay 25% "of its net win from all gaming devices operated by it or on its
behalf to the Gaming Revenue Trust Fund."' 1 The term net win is defined as
"the wagering revenue from all gaming devices operated by the Indian tribe or
on its behalf retained after prizes or winnings have been paid to players or to
pools dedicated to the payment of such prizes and winnings, and prior to the
payment of operating or other expenses.' 10 2
The second revenue sharing provision, whose funds flow to the Gaming
Revenue Trust Fund, applies to owners of official gambling establishments and
allowed horse racing tracks.0 3 These provisions require owners of both gambling
and horse racing establishments to pay 30% "of the net win from gaming devices
operated by them to the Gaming Revenue Trust Fund." " Under this provision,
owners of gambling establishments and authorized horse racing tracks must pay
for an annual audit to make certain their net wins are "properly reported and..
.properly paid to the Gaming Revenue Trust Fund."'0 5 These owners must also
pay 2% of their net wins "to the city in which each authorized horse racing track
and authorized gambling establishment is located."' ' If either of the owner's
operations fall outside of city boundaries, the 2% payment "shall be made to the
county in which the authorized gambling establishment or authorized horse
racing track is located."'0 7 On top of this fee, California also requires tribes to
97. Id. § 19(o.
98. Eric S. Lent, Are States Beating the House?: The Validity of Tribal-State Revenue
Sharing Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 91 GEO. L.J. 451,456 (2003) (citing Carol
Sowers, Indian Casino Profits Get States'Attention, ARIz. REPuBuc, Sept. 15, 2000, at Al).
99. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 190)(1).
100. Id. § 19(j)(1).
101. Id. § 19(h)(1).
102. Id. § 19(h)(1).
103. Id. § 19(i)(1)(a).
104. Id. § 19(i)(1)(a).
105. Id. § 19(i)(1)(C).
106. Id. § 19(i)(1)(D).
107. Id. § 19(i)(1)(D).
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pay a fee of 1% of net wins to be paid to the "county in which each authorized
gambling establishment and authorized horse racing track is located."'08
The Gaming Revenue Trust Fund first provides that 1% of the revenues goes
to the California Gambling Control Commission for assistance with managerial
duties and for "reimbursement of any state department or agency that provides
any service pursuant to... the Gaming Revenue Act of 2004."1°9 Second, the
fund guarantees that non-gaming tribes will receive $1.2 million annually from
the fund." 0 "'Non-gaming tribe' shall mean a federally recognized Indian tribe
which operates fewer than 350 gaming devices.""'  Thus, tribes that sign
compacts with the Gaming Revenue Trust Fund provision are essentially
"licens[ing] other tribe's rights to operate gaming devices."' 1 2 Third, the fund
provides $3 million annually "to responsible gambling programs. 3
Fourth, if there are remaining funds after meeting the previously listed three
provisions, the distribution of revenues occurs in the following order. 114 First,
50% of the remaining revenues goes toward the "county offices of education to
provide services for abused and neglected children and children in foster care. ' "5
The funds are allocated to county offices and used for different purposes." 6
Second, 35% of the remaining funds is distributed to "local governments on a per
capita basis for additional neighborhood sheriffs and police officers."'"17 Last,
15% of the remaining revenues is distributed to "local governments on a per
capita basis for additional firefighters." ' 8
Indian tribes in California seem willing to participate in revenue sharing for
purposes of expanding Indian gaming. " 9 However, Indian tribes in California
oppose compacts that would allow "non-Indian" card clubs and racetracks to
operate slots thus making the exclusive right to operate slot machines a crucial
point for discussion. 2 ' In August 2004, California Governor Arnold
108. Id. § 19(i)(l)(E).
109. Id. § 19(j)(3)(A).
110. Id. § 19(j)(3)(B).
Ill. Id. IV § 19(0)(3)(C).
112. In re Indian Gaming Related Cases, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
113. CAL. CONST. art. IV § 19(j)3)(C).
114. Id. § 190)(3)(D).
115. Id. § 19(j)(3)(D)(i).
116. Id. § 19(j)(3)(D)(i)(I)-(IV).
117. Id. § 19(j)(3)(D)(ii).
118. Id. § 19(j)(3)(D)(ii).
119. See, e.g., Gregg Jones, Help from Tribes No Done Deal, L.A. TIMES, June 15, 2003, at
Al.
120. Exclusivity a Focus in Gaming Compact Negotiations, INDIANz.COM, June 7, 2004,
available at http://www.indianz.com/IndianGaming/2004/002793.asp?print=l.
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Schwarzenegger signed new additional compacts pertaining to the state. 12 1 The
state expects these new compacts to produce an additional $200 million for the
state on an annual basis.
122
Indian tribes and other supporters of the "multimillion-dollar ballot effort to
end Indian tribal monopoly . .. fizzled before California's voters.' 2 3 In
November2004, Governor Schwarzenegger advised voters to decline the passage
of legislation that would expand tribal-gaming along with stating a percentage of
gaming profits for the State of California. 124 His reasoning being that he could
"negotiate more lucrative deals for the state" thus tapping into more monies made
as a result of tribal gaming. 25
3. Connecticut
Connecticut was the first state to challenge a tribe's right to offer Class III
gaming operations pursuant to IGRA.'26 The Pequot Tribe sued Connecticut
after the state denied the Tribe the compact needed to open a tribal casino.'27 The
Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision thus supporting the Indians
and allowing for Class I gaming. 2 However, following the Seminole Tribe
decision, Connecticut became the first state to receive revenues under a revenue
sharing agreement. 29 The compacts required the Indian tribes to pay Connecticut
$100 million or 25% of revenues generated from slot machines. 30 These revenue
sharing compacts in return provided an incentive to the tribe by giving them the
exclusive rights to install slot machines.'
Following this exclusive grant to the Pequot tribe, the Mohegans became
Connecticut's second federally recognized tribe. 32 The Mohegans also wanted
to engage in tribal gaming and entered into an agreement with the Pequot tribe. 3
121. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
122. Id.
123. Rita Beamish, Supporters of Calif. Casino Measure Back Off, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 10,
2004, at A13.
124. Prah, supra note 69.
125. Id.
126. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1029 (2d. Cir. 1990).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 501, 511 (1995).
131. Id.
132. Hilary Waldman & David Lightman, Mohegans Get Federal Tribal Status, HARTFORD
COURANT, May 18, 1994, at Al.
133. George Judson, Weicker Signs Agreement with Two Tribes on Casino Gambling, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 1994, at BI.
[Vol. 29
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol29/iss2/4
In this agreement, both tribes promised annually to pay $80 million to
Connecticut. 134 In return, the tribes received the right of a near monopoly on
casino games.135 If Connecticut allows the building of casinos to take place by
someone other than a member of these two named tribes, the annual payments
to Connecticut would stop.
136
The State of Connecticut ranked as the second highest-grossing state in 2003,
reaching the two billion dollar mark.137 The two agreements reached with
Connecticut's tribes will provide a gain to Connecticut's general fund of "$405
million in F[iscal]Y[ear] 2004... with local governments receiving $85 million
of the total."' 38 Furthermore, the year 2005 estimates an amount of "$345
million to state coffers."'
139
4. Wisconsin
Wisconsin began requiring revenue sharing after the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Seminole Tribe and after previous tribal state compacts not
requiring revenue sharing expired."4 The compacts required tribes to pay the
state 3% of their net gaming revenues. 4' An amendment to the compacts
provided that 7.6% of net gaming revenues go to the state.142 Furthermore, in
2003 additional amendments increased the amount of revenue the state would
receive. 4 3 Wisconsin's compacts state that Indian tribes will invest millions of
dollars to the State of Wisconsin while creating 25,000 new jobs in the state.'
Under Wisconsin law, the governor may enter into gaming compacts with
Indian tribes.'45 The majority of Wisconsin's compacts require the Governor to
allocate the received revenues to benefit Indian tribes, but the legislature is not
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. George Judson, In GamblingDebate, Foes Await Bridgeport Casino Vote, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1995, at 44.
137. Prah, supra note 69.
138. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
139. Prah, supra note 69.
140. See Tom Sheehan, Multi-Tribe Council Sought in State; The Goal Is to Enhance
Communication Between Tribes and State, Wis. ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at B1.
141. Sarah Wyatt, Spending of Gambling Money Set: Budget Panel Agrees on Two-Year
Plan, WIS. ST. J., May 25, 2001, at B3.
142. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
143. Id.
144. Press Release, Jim Doyle, Governor of Wisconsin, Statement of Governor Doyle
Regarding Indian Gaming Lawsuit (May 13, 2004).
145. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 14.035(1) (West 2003); see generally Panzer v. Doyle, 680 N.W.
2d 666 (2004) (allowing Governor to enter into compacts with Indian tribes).
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forced to account for these allocations in the budget. " Wisconsin did not use the
revenues for the sole benefit of the tribes. The state did use the revenues to fund
tourism and economic development.' 47 The state also uses the funds to help
balance the budget.148 The tribes in Wisconsin are unhappy with the use of the
revenues, and to address this problem, the state has asked tribal leaders to submit
suggestions for revenue use in the future.149 Disagreement over the use of
revenues have "strained relations between some tribes and the state."'' 0
The State of Wisconsin ranks third among states that receive gaming revenue,
falling far behind the two leading states of California and Connecticut. 5' State
leaders hope to reach an agreement with Indian tribes that will provide a better
benefit to the state. 1 2 The state hopes to negotiate future contracts to increase
Indian revenue payments to the state.'53 However, unlike Connecticut, the State
of Wisconsin cannot offer the same level of exclusivity that surrounding states
offer.15
4
5. Michigan
On August 20, 1993, an agreement between seven tribes and the state of
Michigan designated that 8% of net gaming revenues from Class I1 gaming
would go to the state."' This 8% went toward the state's "Strategic Fund."'
156
Two percent of net revenues went to local government units.5 7 The 8%
agreement provided exclusive rights to operate electronic gaming within the State
146. Wyatt, supra note 141, at B3.
147. Sheehan, supra note 140, at B1.
148. Id.
149. Wyatt, supra note 141, at B3.
150. Tom Sheehan, Casinos Eye Long-term Compacts: Higher Paymentsfor Longer Deals
a Possibility, WIS. ST. J., Sept. 24, 2002, at B3.
151. Tom Sheehan, Republicans Say State Could Get More From Tribes, Wis. ST. J., May
22, 2004, at B.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. George Lewis, State Got the Best Deal It Couldfrom Ho-Chunk, WIS. ST. J., June 27,
2004, at B2.
155. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82; see Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 93 F. Supp. 2d 850, 851 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
156. See JERRY GRIFFIN, REPORT TO THE MICHIGAN HOUSE FISCAL AGENCY, A HISTORY OF
INDIAN GAMING IN MICHIGAN, available at http://www.house.state.mi.us/hfa/gaming96. html
(1996).
157. Michigan Gaming Law Website, Overview of Gaming in Michigan, at
http://www.michigangaming.con/Overview.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2004) [hereinafter
Overview of Gaming in Michigan]
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of Michigan.158 If the state reneged on its duties under the agreement, the tribes
would stop making the 8% payments.1
59
Three years following the entry of the exclusivity agreements, Michigan
passed a law that allowed for additional tribes to enter into tribal gaming
compacts. 6 Based on the agreement providing for exclusive rights to operate
electronic games, the initial seven tribes stopped paying revenues to the state.
16
'
The courts upheld the validity of the right to stop payments when the "the right
was extended" and thus diminished the tribes exclusive right to operate.
162
Despite the loss of revenue sharing agreements, the State of Michigan still
managed to receive gaming revenues by entering into new compacts with other
tribes.
63
Michigan's new compacts continue to provide revenue to both state and local
governments." The monies received by the Michigan Strategic Fund in the
fiscal year of 2004 "approach[ed] $15 million."' 65 Furthermore, the 2% portion
of the gaming revenues totaled $17 million in fiscal year 2004.166
6. New Mexico
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe in 1995, New Mexico
gaming compacts provided for revenue sharing. 167 In 1997, the state renegotiated
the previous compacts and endorsed a new revenue sharing program.16  The
compacts required the tribes to pay 16% of net revenues generated from slot
machines to the state. 169 Many tribes expressed their displeasure with the state's
payment structure set forth in the 1997 compacts.
170
158. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82; see Sault Ste. Marie Tribe
of Chippewa Indians, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
159. Id.
160. See Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 434.201-26
(2002).
161. Overview of Gaming in Michigan, supra note 157.
162. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 851.
163. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11, 15 (N.M. 1995).
168. Madrid Focuses Gaming Suit on State's Rights; Tribes Call Compact Illegal Taxation,
ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 16, 2000, at E3 (state legislature approved new gaming compacts that
included provisions for 16% of revenue sharing).
169. See Babbitt Press Release, supra note 78.
170. Madrid Focuses Gaming Suit on State's Rights; Tribes Call Compact Illegal Taxation,
supra note 168.
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The main concern with the 1997 compacts was not that the tribes felt that
revenue sharing was illegal, but that the tribes "simply [did] not like the state's
bottom line placed on the value of the exclusivity granted to the tribes with
respect to gambling."'' Many tribes eventually agreed to enter into compacts in
order to receive the opportunity to participate in Class I gaming. 7 2 Former
Secretary of the Interior Babbitt raised concern with the structure of the
compacts because the compacts failed to provide for substantial exclusivity of
gaming activities but rather provided for limited exclusivity.7 3 Furthermore,
Babbitt stated, "My most serious concern is the state's insistence that the tribes
make large payments to the state."' 74 Babbitt further stated that "[t]o date, the
Department has approved.. .payments to a State...only [when] the State has agreed
to provide.., substantial 'exclusivity,' by prohibiting non-Indian gaming from
competing with Indian gaming" or when all payments cease while the State
permits competition to take place. 75 Aurene Martin at the Senate Committee on
Indian Affairs reiterated this notion in 2001.176
In 2001, new tribal compacts were approved. 17 The agreements provided that
the tribes pay the state 8%, reduced from the previous 16% of slot machine
revenues. 1 8 The new compacts also provide for exclusivity provisions that are
very similar to the previous compacts questioned by Secretary Babbitt. 17' The
compacts provide the exclusive right for tribes to operate Class III tribal gaming;
however, states need not bar racetracks nor "fraternal, veterans or other nonprofit
membership organizations" from participating in electronic gaming.180
Assistant United States Department of Interior Secretary Neal A. McCaleb
wrote a letter to Governor Gary Johnson that permitted states to receive a
percentage of revenues if the tribes received substantial exclusivity over
gaming. 18 The McCaleb letter was a compromise on exclusivity in an effort to
171. Id.
172. Gatsby Contreras, Exclusivity Agreements In Tribal-State Compacts: Mutual Benefit
Revenue-Sharing Or Illegal State Taxation, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 487, 500 (2002).
173. Babbitt Press Release, supra note 78.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, supra note 66.
177. S. 804, 45th Legis., 1 st Sess. (N.M. 2001); see Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with
States, supra note 82.
178. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
179. Babbitt Press Release, supra note 78 (gaming compacts failed to include exclusivity for
tribal gaming).
180. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-13-2 (Michie 1978), amended by 1997 N.M. LAWS 15-(4)(B).
181. Jonathan McDonald, Fee Fight, SANTA FE NEW MEXICAN, Nov. 29, 2001, at B 1; see
Lent, supra note 98, at 461.
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NOTES
bring the tribes together by holding geographic exclusivity of tribal gaming equal
to that of substantial exclusivity.'82 This compromise, along with Babbitt's
informal policy statements regarding substantial exclusivity, does not provide a
bright-line test or rule for future tribal-gaming compacts.'83 Furthermore, we now
see the tribes agreeing to participate in revenue sharing for "limited" as opposed
to exclusive or substantial gambling competition."
The State ofNew Mexico projects that revenue of $34.7 million for fiscal year
2004 and an increased $36.4 million for fiscal year 2005 to its general fund.185
7. New York
The Governor of the State of New York has the ability to enter into tribal state
compacts pursuant to the IGRA. 86 The state uses these revenues to reimburse
local governments that provide tribal casinos for job growth and state economic
development. 87 A portion of some counties' revenue goes toward the treatment
of individuals facing gambling addiction. 88 The remaining revenues "shall be
transferred to the general fund for the support of government."'
8 9
The Mohawk Tribe agreed to give the State of New York up to 25% of its
gaming revenues; however, this occurred after the Oneida Nation agreed to share
revenues in what amounted to virtually nil.' 9° Following this agreement, the
Seneca Nation expressed its willingness to provide 25% of its gaming
revenues.' 9 ' The Senecas reached an agreement and signed a compact with the
State of New York providing 25% of revenues to the state.
192
The Seneca agreements provide exclusivity in the form of a gaming
monopoly.' 93 Furthermore, the Mohawk Tribe in New York amended its tribal
compacts with the state to provide a gradual revenue sharing plan in exchange for
exclusivity." 4 The amendment stated that "no other person or entity other than
182. See Lent, supra note 98, at 461 n.93.
183. Contreras, supra note 172, at 507.
184. See Jeff Jones, Tribe, A G Cut Slot Deal, ALBUQUERQUE J., Apr. 21, 2004, at 1.
185. Tribal Gaming: Sharing Revenue with States, supra note 82.
186. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 12(a) (McKinney 2002).
187. N.Y. STATE FINANCE LAW § 99-h(3)(a) (McKinney 2002).
188. Id. § 99-h(3)(b).
189. Id.
190. Jerry Zremski, Senecas Uncommonly Generous In Giving State A 25% Casino Cut,
BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 5, 2001, at Al.
191. Id.
192. Zremski, supra note 190.
193. See id.
194. Act of Oct. 19, 2004, ch. 590, S.5670-A, 2004 Sess. N.Y. Laws (amending Mohawk
Tribe Compact).
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an Indian nation or tribe shall be permitted to ... or operate, slot machines
within the geographic area as defined by the counties .. . ."9' If New York
breaches the promised exclusivity provisions provided for in the tribal compacts,
the Mohawk's payments will cease. 196  Individuals have raised concerns
regarding exclusivity provisions that acted as monopolies. The State of New
York continues to provide this benefit to tribes in exchange for revenue
sharing. 1
97
V George Skibine Provides Suggestions in Resolving the Confusion with
Exclusivity Provisions in Revenue-Sharing Compacts
George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Economic
Development in the Office of the Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs at the
Department of the Interior, spoke before the Committee on Indian Affairs on
March 24, 2004.198 Mr. Skibine attended the committee meeting to support the
Amendments of 2004 to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. 9 9 One of Mr.
Skibine's priorities was to address "uncertainties created by... the Seminole v.
Florida case and existing revenue-sharing schemes adopted by tribes and states
and approved by the Department."2"
Mr. Skibine noted that revenue sharing agreements that provided for
substantial exclusivity to operate Class Ill gaming did receive departmental
approval.20' Mr. Skibine endorsed the Department's support for a "statutory
basis for revenue sharing provisions in Class III gaming compacts" but felt the
"conditions for apportionment should be modified." 20 2 Mr. Skibine proposed that
the amendments to IGRA needed to provide a "clearer definition of the
substantial benefits that Congress determines are appropriate in exchange for
revenue-sharing. '"203
To date, the Department continues to assert that substantial exclusivity of
Class III gaming allows for the revenue sharing among a tribe and its local
195. Id. § 1(c).
196. Id. § 1(d).
197. Zremski, supra note 190.
198. The Indian GamingRegulatoryActAmendments of2OO3 , Before the Senate Committee
Hearings on Indian Affairs (2004) [hereinafter IGRA Amendments of2003 Hearings] (statement
of George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Economic Development
in the Office of the Assistant Secretary).
199. Idat 1.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 2.
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state. 2°4 However, Mr. Skibine did indicate that if Congress envisioned further
benefits, the Department would ask that more explanation be provided to address
these benefits." 5 Furthermore, Mr. Skibine expressed the Department's
recommendation that Congress consider placing a limit on the amount of revenue
shared in compacts. 2' The revenue payment should be at most 10% to avoid
qualifying as a tax.207 This would be a safeguard to protect tribes from having
to pay increased revenue to the state.
The final issue raised by Mr. Skibine concerned compacts that included
anticompetitive provisions.28 The compacts' provisions provided tribes with a
"protected territory, outside of its reservation, in which they may game."2" This
provision guarantees exclusivity, thus creating a barrier to non-compacted tribes
who may desire to locate a facility outside of the reservation.210 Mr. Skibine
stated that "[t]his limitation as applied to other tribes appears to violate the spirit
of IGRA, but there is no express prohibition contained in the Act., 21' The
Department and Congress face, once again, the problems of exclusivity
provisions.
Conclusion
To amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is a major step in restructuring
the scope of tribal-state gaming compacts. Though there seems to be much
disenchantment with revenue sharing between tribes and states, the driving force
behind these agreements is the opportunity for tribes to operate Class 111 gaming,
and for states to take advantage of the gaming success. Furthermore, the
classification of exclusivity has not reached consensus amongjurisdictions. Will
exclusivity eventually fade out of the picture due to states' concerns against
monopoly power, or will tribes keep their sovereignty with regard to operating
gaming? The next undertaking of the Congress, working with the Department
of the Interior, should be to address these fundamental issues.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Tom Wanamaker, Let the Games Begin: A Revenue Sharing Cap of Ten
Percent?,INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Apr. 6, 2004 (quoting George Skibine) available at
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id = 1081281811.
208. IGRA Amendments of 2003 Hearings, supra note 198, at 3.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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